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Arabian American Oil Company. 
 
Absorption Capacity  
Maximum amount of capital a given economy can handle. 
 
House of Saud 
Ruling royal family of Saudi Arabia, which maintains absolute control in the Kingdom. 
 
JECOR 
US-Saudi Arabian Joint Economic Commission. 
 
JSCOR 
US-Saudi Arabian Joint Security Commission. 
 
KSA 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
 
OPEC  
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries. 
 
OAPEC  
Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries. 
 
Petrodollar 
A unit of currency earned by a country from the export of petroleum. 
 
PLFP 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. 
 
Posted Price  
Average price that serves as a benchmark for a commodity.  
 
Seven Sisters Seven largest oil companies that dominated the market between the 1940s 
and 1970s. 
 
Swing Producer A commodity supplier with enough spare production capacity to 
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On October 14th 1973, eight days into the October War, Henry Kissinger sent a telegram 
to King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, informing him that the US had been resupplying Israel with arms 
to counter the Soviet’s “massive airlift” to Egypt and Syria. The King responded: 
“We do care very much about the continuation of our friendship with the 
United States [but we] wish that those responsible…would realize the 
seriousness of [this] step and that the continuation of the American stand 
on the side of Israel will expose our relations to [being] lukewarm.”1 
While Faisal (r. 1964-1975) had long opposed “Zionist rule”2 in Palestine, by the early 70s he 
worried that cooperation between the US and Israel would embolden Arab socialists and 
endanger the stability of his own US-backed regime.3 While Kissinger tried to justify US 
intervention in terms of communist containment, the King believed it was American support for 
Israel that provoked Soviet encroachment in the Arab world—not the other way around.4  Thus, 
when President Nixon requested $2.2 billion worth of “Emergency Security Assistance for Israel 
from Congress,” just two days after receiving Faisal’s warning, the King was sure to respond 
with more than a cautionary telegram.5 
The next day the Saudi government announced, “in view of the increase of American 
military aid to Israel, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has decided to halt all exports to the United 
States of America.”6 While Libya and the UAE had already imposed oil embargos on the US to 
aid in the Arab war effort, shortly after the world’s largest exporter, Saudi Arabia, took a stand, 
the rest of the Arab oil producers quickly followed.7 Over the next five months, the embargo and 
resultant quadrupling of the price of oil wreaked havoc on oil-consuming economies, sowed 
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division in the Atlantic Bloc, and bestowed unprecedented amounts of wealth and power upon 
Arab oil producers. 
For these reasons, Eric Hobsbawm marked the oil crisis as a turning point between the 
post-war “Golden Age” of Western capitalism and the “Crisis Decades” of the 70s and 80s.8 In 
Crude Awakening, Steve Yetiv argues, “the embargo…represented perhaps history’s biggest 
peaceful transfer of wealth from industrialized states to developing ones…[it] clashed directly 
with a central objective of OPEC…the pledge to achieve order and stability in the international 
oil market.”9 Indeed, rather than preserve stability, the former Secretary General of OPEC, 
Fadhil al-Chalabi described the oil embargo as “representative of a fundamental shift in power 
relations between oil producers and consumers.” 10  By 1973, the embargo’s success in 
empowering Arab oil producers and enervating Western consumers provoked Kissinger to 
exclaim, “We are now living in a never-never land in which tiny, poor, and weak nations can 
hold up for ransom some of the industrialized world.”11 For officials of those “weak nations,” 
however, the embargo was cause for celebration. In October, Yamani declared, “The moment 
has come. We are finally masters of our own commodity.”12 For his role in orchestrating the 
embargo, King Faisal is remembered as a “symbol of defiance in the eyes of many Muslims.”13 
Despite the political and economic significance of the 1973 oil embargo, this thesis 
explains that it did not go so far as to elevate the Saudis to a position of complete mastery over 
their Kingdom. While the embargo empowered the KSA economically—by inflating oil prices 
and facilitating their takeover of Aramco—and politically—by pressuring the US to change its 
stance on the Arab-Israeli crisis—the embargo simultaneously deepened the KSA’s dependence 
on the US. Just as the House of Saud had relied on foreign arms, capital, and skilled labor since 
the beginning of its consolidation of state power, after the embargo, the regime came to depend 
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on heightened levels of US support for security, economic development, and investment 
management.14 Just five months after the embargo was imposed, on March 18th the KSA lifted 
sanctions on the US—prior to the realization of the embargo’s original demands: the return of all 
the Arab territories occupied during the Six-Day War and the restoration of Palestinian rights.15 
In the following weeks, the Kingdom invested billions of fresh petrodollars in US coffers.16 
Rather than dismantling Saudi dependence on the US, the embargo served to further the 
development of new imperial relations between the two states by increasing the stakes of 
America’s access to Saudi oil, on the one hand, and heightening the KSA’s dependence on arms 
and capital management, on the other. 
While prior scholars have advanced general frameworks for understanding the US-Saudi 
“special relationship”1 during the Cold War,17 fewer have analyzed its transformations during 
discrete periods—as this thesis attempts to do with respect to the 1973-1974 embargo. Those 
scholars that focus on the embargo, such as Daoudi, Dajani, and Yetiv, tend to overstate its 
negative impact on US-Saudi relations.18 Scholars who take the long-durée approach, such as 
Madawi al-Rahseed, on the other hand, often brush over the embargo as a token measure to quell 
radicalism, but stop short of unpacking its complex aims and outcomes. In Rasheed’s History of 
Saudi Arabia, which spans three centuries, the embargo is summarized as, “rhetoric of 
confrontation…[which] masked a partnership that had been developing behind the scenes.”19 
This position places Rasheed in a long line of scholars who describe US-Saudi relations as 
something like a “balancing act”: the KSA aligned with the US out of existential necessity, but 
distanced itself for fear of inciting anti-imperial dissent. 
                                                
1 “Special Relationship” is an unofficial IR term used to describe close political, 
economic, and military ties between two countries, originally used in reference to the US 
 8 
Gregory Gause III, who first coined the term “balancing act” in reference to US-Saudi 
relations, argues that the US and KSA came together throughout the Cold War due to the 
former’s policies of containment and the latter’s opposition to “atheist communist doctrines.”20 
While the US saw the KSA as a vital bulwark against communism in the Persian Gulf—due to 
its oil wealth2 and strategic location along the southern flank of the USSR—the KSA saw the US 
as a strong ally in its perennial “Search for Security.”21 On the other hand, Gause explains, the 
Saudis periodically tempered relations with the US in order to pacify internal and external anti-
imperial threats. Thus, while the Saudis at times relied on the US for security, the visibility of 
reliance also jeopardized their stability. 22 While Gause’s approach is powerful in its descriptive 
flexibility over long periods of time, it ultimately reduces the 1973 embargo to just one of many 
attempts by the Saudi monarchy to “modify and control the political behavior of the radical Arab 
states.”23 
This thesis takes the position that the embargo neither ruptured nor masked ties between 
the US and KSA, but facilitated the development of a new imperial relationship. Accordingly, it 
draws on both scholarship that sees continuity in US-Saudi relations throughout the Cold War 
and that which highlights the ruptures produced by the 1973 oil embargo. For the US, this thesis 
argues, the interrelated political and economic repercussions of the embargo directly contributed 
to the notion that “closer US-Arab ties were needed.”24 Specifically, by raising global oil prices, 
upsetting Western Bloc alliances, and risking the spread of communism around the globe, the 
embargo heightened the stakes of America’s access to the world’s largest petroleum producer. 
While political, economic, and military cooperation with the Kingdom became instrumental to 
                                                
2 Arab oil was integral to the reconstruction of Western Europe and Japan. 
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ending the embargo, the lifting of the embargo was not an end in itself, but a means to lowering 
oil prices and preventing a downward spiral for non-communist economies. 
For the Saudis, the embargo not only enriched their Kingdom, but made it more 
vulnerable to instability. Indeed, the windfall gains from oil price increases enlarged not only 
Saudi reserves, but those of its oil-producing foes in Iraq and Iran. Equally, newfound oil wealth 
exceeded the bounds of what could be invested in the KSA’s domestic economy and warranted 
outside capital management. Though there was nothing inevitable about the KSA’s continued 
reliance on the US, the superpower leveraged its military and economic superiority to coopt the 
Saudi government. 
Ultimately, this thesis argues, the embargo represented neither a complete termination 
nor continuation, but rather an alteration of what many have called an “imperial” relationship 
between the US and KSA.25 While the embargo gave more autonomy to the Saudis with respect 
to their oilfields—the classic locus of imperialism—it simultaneously deepened the KSA’s “new 
imperial” dependence on American security, non-oil economic development, and financial 
institutions. 26  Specifically, while the US-Saudi relationship, prior to the embargo, was 
characterized by the impingement on Saudi sovereignty by a transnational firm—insofar as the 
latter leveraged its dominant access to capital, labor, and knowledge to expropriate the former’s 
oil, as Samuel Huntington and others have noted27—after the embargo, the US government 
capitalized on the military and economic insecurity of the Saudi state and retained access to the 
resource its transnational corporation lost. The embargo, therefore, directly contributed to the 
formation of a new imperial relationship by exacerbating the Saudi government’s need for 
outside support, on the one hand, and raising the stakes of the US government’s access to Saudi 
oil, on the other. To better understand the nuances of this new imperial relationship, it will help 
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to compare some of the ways other scholars have employed the term imperialism and then 
delineate between classical and contemporary definitions. 
 
In A House Built on Sand, Helen Lackner argues, “unlike other Third World countries, 
Saudi Arabia is rich: its oil revenues are astronomical and it therefore need not be dependent on 
imperialism for investment capital, though it remains dependent for the importation of 
technology and labour.”28 Here, Lackner refrains from labeling the KSA as a full-scale imperial 
subject on par with other “Third World” states because it is not dependent on foreign capital. 
This conception of US-Saudi relations falls short not only because it neglects Saudi dependence 
on US arms and capital management, but because it wrongly prioritizes the absence of capital as 
a constituent of imperial subjugation. In the latter respect, Lackner’s definition of imperialism 
draws a direct line from Lenin’s text, Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism.  
For Lenin, imperialism was “the domination of finance capital…over all other forms of 
capital…it means that a small number of financially “powerful” states stand out among all the 
rest.”29 This definition is similar to Lackner’s insofar as they both emphasize capital dominance 
as a constituent of imperialism. Though there is nothing objectively wrong with this conception, 
if taken to its logical extension in the Saudi case, far from describing the Kingdom as an imperial 
subject, one would have to denote it as an imperial power in and of itself. After the embargo, 
indeed, Saudi petrodollars attained such a dominant position in the international monetary 
system that they not only reinforced, but benefited from American monetary hegemony.30 
Accordingly, this thesis does not define the US-Saudi relationship as neo-imperial3 for its lack of 
symbiosis, but because the Saudis depended, in part, on the US to manage their wealth to a 
                                                
3 For purposes of this thesis, neo-imperial and new imperial are used interchangeably. 
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greater degree than the US depended on access to Saudi petrodollars [chapter 3]. The question of 
whether or not the KSA can itself be described as an imperial power—due to its petrodollar 
dominance over other states—exceeds the bounds of this thesis. 
Moving on, Fred Halliday’s description of the US-Saudi relationship echoes some of 
Lackner’s arguments, but offers an important distinction about the “imperial” intentions of the 
US government. In Arabia Without Sultans, Halliday argues, “Unlike other clients in the third 
world, Saudi Arabia was not in need of financial aid: it had enough money from the oil revenues 
provided by Aramco, and the US government was willing to encourage greater Saudi revenues as 
large-scale capitalist development benefited imperials.”31 The focus on US intentions differs 
from Lackner insofar as it prioritizes access to foreign markets over capital dominance. This 
emphasis places Halliday on the other side of a classic debate between critics of imperialism. 
One of Lenin’s contemporaries and challengers, John Hobson argued, "[imperialism] 
implies the use of the machinery of government by private interests, mainly capitalists, to secure 
for them economic gains outside their country…to secure and develop at the public expense and 
by the public force private markets for their surplus.”32 Like Halliday, Hobson prioritizes 
markets over capital, while Lenin and Lackner emphasize capital dominance. Once again, the 
former conception of imperialism cannot be said to be incorrect in all cases, but falters in its 
application to the US-Saudi case. This thesis argues that the US government did not encourage 
new imperial development in the KSA for the benefit of industrialists, but to “bring oil prices 
down” [chapter 3].33 Indeed, if the US truly sought to “encourage greater Saudi revenues” for the 
benefit of its “imperials,” one might go so far as to say that the Nixon administration encouraged 
the oil crisis. Because there is scant evidence for this interpretation, this thesis adopts the term 
new imperialism to encompass imperial relations outside the realms of markets and capital. 
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Ultimately, this thesis avoids the classical definitions of imperialism alluded to by 
Lakcner and Halliday because it seeks to describe a situation in which the US state advanced its 
economic interests in another sovereign state without coercion. Theorists like Lenin and Hobson, 
on the other hand, argued that the “machinery of government,” namely the military, was 
responsible for facilitating imperial expansion into other “territories.” For this reason, a 
contemporary wave of scholarship on “The New Imperial State” has argued, “The word 
imperialism is out of fashion”; “What is emerging is a non-territorial empire with its imperial 
capital in Washington, D.C.”3435 As Peter Gowan explains, “the distinctive feature of American 
expansion, in contrast to the west European juridical empires of the first half of the twentieth 
century, has been the attempt to use the international system of sovereign states as a mechanism 
of American global dominance.”36 Thus, rather than directly impinge on the sovereignty of the 
KSA, in the case of US-Saudi relations, the US capitalized on the interests of the KSA to 
advance its new imperial agenda [chapter 2]. 
With both classical and contemporary definitions of imperialism in mind, it can now be 
made clear that the US government never played a classically imperial role in the KSA. Instead, 
the pre-embargo US-Saudi relationship is more akin to what Samuel Huntington describes as 
transnational “penetration.”37  Although the penetration of Saudi oilfields by Aramco was 
certainly contingent on the political union between the US and KSA—especially in the 60s and 
early 70s [chapter 1]—it did not require the imposition of US sovereignty on Saudi sovereignty; 
it was, rather, a consensual and symbiotic, albeit unequal, concessionary system between a 
government and a transnational firm. The role of the US government was not only practically 
removed from the advancement of Aramco’s penetration, but also discouraged. In 1947, when 
the executive branch of the US government proposed buying equity in Aramco—like the British 
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had done with British Petroleum—the United States’ Congress blocked it due to its imperial 
overtones.38 None of this is to say that governmental influence was absent from the KSA—
indeed, the Saudis consistently ordered arms from the US government—but more to say that 
Aramco was the United States government’s main conduit to the Kingdom—not the other way 
around. In this way, what some have curiously described as imperial prior to the embargo was, in 
reality, neither classically imperial, nor hardly neo-imperial. 
After the embargo, when the KSA grew empowered to take control of Aramco, only then 
did the US government take a more active role in facilitating the expansion of its transnational 
firms by engaging the House of Saud in more overt forms of government-to-government 
interaction. The Joint Commission on Economic Cooperation, singed just weeks after the 
embargo’s termination, was an important case in which the American and Saudi governments 
agreed to have American public institutions and private firms develop the latter’s economy in 
exchange for petrodollars [chapter 3]. In this case, the US government represented a new 
imperial power insofar as it implemented non-coercive measures to secure non-territorial access 
to Saudi oil in the form of indirect control over oil prices. 
Ironically, this development in the US-Saudi relationship represents an almost complete 
reversal of what many have described as a progression from statist autarky to “end of history” 
neoliberalism, a process that deterministically ends with the death of the nation state and the 
birth of the free flow of goods and capital.39 US-Saudi relations, on the other hand, can perhaps 
be best described as neoliberal prior to the embargo—insofar as Aramco was an “invisible 
empire,” relatively autonomous from both the US and Saudi governments—and neo-imperial 
after the embargo—insofar as the Joint Commission on Economic Security represented a 
retrenchment of, namely governmental, relations between the US and KSA.40 
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Chapter one of this thesis traces the US-Saudi relationship in the lead-up to the embargo. 
It begins by exploring a previous and failed embargo attempt in 1967. In the 60s, the KSA was 
enmeshed in an “Arab Cold War” that undermined its stability and demanded reliance on US and 
British support. The US economy, on the other hand, was relatively independent of Saudi oil. 
Thus, chapter one argues, the 1967 embargo was neither motivated by genuine opposition to the 
US—but pressures external to the Saudi regime—nor resulted in significant opposition to the 
US—because of its symbolic and material harmlessness. Because the US was largely 
independent of Saudi oil, the 1967 embargo resulted in the weakening of embargoing countries 
rather than those embargoed.41 Over the next six years, chapter one concludes, increased demand 
for oil would heighten the industrial world’s dependence on Arab producers and increase the 
feasibility of another embargo. Decreased political pressure on the Saudis, moreover, rendered 
their opposition more personal and impactful. 
Coupling sincere intent with severe impact, the “oil weapon” of 1973, as it came to be 
known, resulted in reshaping US foreign policy. Chapter two explains that the US reacted to the 
embargo by taking the political demands of Faisal seriously and brokering bilateral 
disengagement agreements between Arab-Israeli belligerents. Equally, the embargo ushered the 
KSA into a new, uncertain position of economic and political power. While the change in US 
foreign policy decreased the Saudis’ political opposition to the US, the changes in the KSA’s 
military and economic position heightened its dependence on outside support. Consequently, the 
embargo was lifted five months after its imposition, prior to the realization of its original 
demands: the return of Israeli-occupied territory and the full restoration of Palestinian rights. 
If the economic and political strains caused by the embargo encouraged the US to seek 
closer political alignment with the KSA, chapter three argues, the consequent oil wealth 
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surpluses and political power in the KSA called for closer union with the US. Following the 
embargo, the primary problem for the US became high oil prices. To ensure that the KSA 
continued to produce an abundance of oil at reasonable prices, therefore, the US encouraged 
higher Saudi budgetary expenses for arms and economic modernization. The KSA realigned with 
the US for these purposes due to the latter’s military and economic superiority in the non-
communist world; additionally, the US leveraged advantageous “add-on” arrangements to attract 
Saudi petrodollars directly into the US Treasury. Finally, this thesis concludes, the economic and 
political ruptures produced by the embargo encouraged the US and KSA to enter a new imperial 






















The US-Saudi Relationship On the Eve of the Embargo 
On May 14th 1967, after receiving false Soviet intelligence that Israeli troops had 
mobilized on the border with Syria, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egypt’s Arab Socialist president, sent 
his own troops to the Sinai Peninsula.42 Two weeks later, on the morning of June 5th, the Israeli 
Air Force launched surprise attacks on 18 Egyptian airbases, destroying over 400 Egyptian, 
Syrian, and Jordanian aircrafts. The next day, King Faisal held a rally in Riyadh, the capital of 
Saudi Arabia. The King exclaimed, “Saudi Arabia will cut off the flow of oil to anyone who aids 
Israel.”43 Because rumors had spread that the US and British resupplied Israel, the crowd 
responded with two words, “Nasser and petrol!”44 In Philosophy of Revolution, Nasser argued 
that Arab oil should be mobilized in the fight against imperialism.45 After nationalizing the Suez 
Canal in 1956, Nasser’s pan-Arab propaganda spread throughout the Middle East and, by the 
time of the Six-Day War, was spilling over into the Saudi Kingdom. Though, in reality, the US 
and Britain denied aid to Israel when the Six-Day War broke out, hardly anyone believed it.46 A 
day after Faisal’s rally, strikes erupted at Aramco’s headquarters in the Eastern Province of 
Saudi Arabia. The King had no choice but to stop the flow of oil. 
Distinct from the 1973 embargo, the 1967 embargo was less rooted in Faisal’s opposition 
to the US and more rooted in immediate existential necessity. In 1967, in fact, the King had 
perhaps more issues with Nasser than the US. Faisal relied on US arms and Aramco’s oil rents 
while he had been fighting a proxy war with Nasser in Yemen for the past five years. Indeed, the 
latter conflict preoccupied Faisal’s coercive apparatus to the point where he was vulnerable to an 
upsurge in domestic dissent.47 Thus, Faisal was not only reluctant to impose the embargo for fear 
of alienating the US, he did not want to directly fuel Nasser’s power. Saudi Arabia’s Oil 
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Minister, Shiekh Yamani, for his part, worried that an embargo would have a “serious impact” 
on Arab economies. Just days after the cessation of oil production, Yamani calculated the 
Kingdom to be losing $10.5 million of revenue per day.48 In addition, Yamani had a gauge on the 
oversupplied international oil market to the point where he knew any decrease in Arab oil 
production would simply result in increases in Texas, Venezuela, and Iran.49 In retrospect, these 
factors rendered the 1967 embargo not only innocuous to its targets, but counterproductive. 
Once the Six-Day war came to an end—resulting in severe losses of life and land for the 
Arab frontline states4—Saudi Arabia immediately tried to get the embargo lifted. Meeting in 
Kuwait on June 18th, “reactionary” states like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Libya advocated for a 
total resumption of shipments to the US and Britain, while “revolutionary” states like Egypt, 
Syria, Iraq, and Algeria wanted to maintain stoppages on the grounds that it would raise global 
prices and undermine imperialist economies.50 Yamani, for his part, invoked the history that Iran 
had lost significant market shares as a result of halting exports during the nationalization dispute 
of 1951. In compromise, the delegation agreed to uphold the embargo against the US and UK 
only. Six weeks later, as Egypt and Syria grew increasingly desperate for post-war economic aid, 
they agreed to terminate the embargo in return for loans.51 Consequently, Nasser evacuated the 
last of his troops from Yemen.52 Just three months after its implementation, the 1967 oil embargo 
ended without any negative impact on the US-Saudi relationship. To the contrary, the KSA was 
able to “stand alone” in its support for the US, as Faisal remarked later.53 
This chapter moves beyond the 1967 embargo to explore how changes in the 
international oil market and political atmosphere in the Middle East—between the Six-Day War 
and October War—converged to render Faisal less dependent on the US and more able to assert 
                                                
4 Israel expanded into the Sinai Peninsula, Golan Heights, West Bank, East Jerusalem, 
and Gaza. 
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control over Saudi production. Though Israeli expansion during the Six-Day War provoked 
further radicalization in the Arab world, it also spelled the decline of Nasser, Faisal’s largest 
threat. As the global demand for oil began to outpace supply, moreover, the KSA was able to 
assert more control over its oil fields—without risking any negative economic impact. With these 
changes, a large and visible American stand on the side of Israel during the next outbreak of 
hostilities would prompt a momentous reassessment of US-Saudi relations. 
 
Between the Wars 
While many scholars mark the Six-Day War as the end of Nasser’s Arab nationalism in 
the region, the expansion of Israel into Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula, Syria’s Golan Heights, and 
Palestine’s Gaza and the West Bank provoked further anti-imperial radicalization in the Arab 
world.54  In July 1968, the Arab nationalist Baath party launched a coup, overtaking Iraq, and a 
leftwing revolution overthrew a conservative monarchy in Libya in September 1969. The USSR, 
for its part, began resupplying Egypt, Syria, and Iraq immediately following the war. To the 
north of Saudi Arabia, Palestinian refugees began pouring into Jordan, conducting guerilla 
warfare against King Hussein’s regime under the banner of the Fedayeen and the Popular Front 
for the Liberation of Palestine (PLFP).55 In the Golan Heights, the PLFP sabotaged Saudi 
Arabia’s largest pipeline, Tapline, in direct opposition to its sale of oil to reactionary powers 
after the Six-Day War and the Syrian government blocked its reconstruction for eight months. 
Influenced by these movements, the Socialist Labor Party in the Arabian Peninsula began 
conducting its own anti-imperial organizing in Saudi Arabia.56 
To the south of the Kingdom, the situation in North and South Yemen continued to worry 
Faisal. Facing balance of payments problems, the British evacuated from South Yemen and the 
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grater Gulf region, leaving the region vulnerable to Marxist movements, which spread from 
Aden in Yemen to Dhofar in neighboring Oman.57 In South Yemen, an Arab Nationalist 
government took power in October 1967 with the express purpose of founding “a base for all the 
revolutionary movements in the heart of the Arabian Peninsula so as to destroy the Faisal 
monarchic regime in Saudi Arabia.”58 Ultimately, just as Nasser had once argued, “King Faisal’s 
danger is that he represents foreign powers hostile to the Arabs,” the new radical movements in 
the Arab World denounced Faisal’s collusion with “imperialism.”59 
While the rest of the Arab world blamed the US and Britain for empowering Israel in the 
Six-Day war, and credited the USSR with supporting the Arab cause, Faisal believed, “[Zionism 
and communism] only pretend to oppose each other.”60 Throughout his “Arab Cold War”61 with 
Nasser, the King had directly countered Nasser’s propaganda by arguing, “revolutionary states 
have bound their destiny to…communism represented by the Soviet Union.62 He denounced 
communism further by arguing, “[it was] founded by the Zionists…[and] seeks to deny the 
existence of God.” 63  By appealing to religion, Faisal was able to condemn the USSR’s 
encroachment in the Arab world while ignoring his own complicity with outside powers. Indeed, 
King Faisal frequently invoked the KSA’s position as the protector of Islam’s holiest cities, 
Mecca and Medina.64 At the first pan-Islamic conference in Mecca in 1962, the attendees 
concluded, “those who renounce Islam and distort its appeal under the guise of nationalism are in 
reality the worst enemies of the Arabs.”65 Thus, rather than see the world in terms of imperial 
states and subjects, Faisal’s ideology carved the globe into those religious and those not. Because 
Americans were Ahl al-Kitab (“People of the Book,” i.e. Christians), Faisal praised them for 
their moral obligation to the “entire free world—including the Muslim world.”66 
 20 
For these reasons, the KSA remained close to the US during and after the Six-Day War. 
To protect himself from the new threats in the region, the King expanded his defense budget by 
more than $2 billion between 1970 and 1971, singing a series of joint arms deals with the British 
and US.67 These purchases raised Saudi Arabia’s per capita defense spending to become the 
world’s largest behind the twelve advanced industrial nations, Israel, and Singapore.68 With 
increased military power, Faisal was able to maintain a handle on the new anti-imperial 
movements sweeping the Arab world.69 Indeed, once Nasser’s influence subsided, the KSA was 
no longer pressed to regulate Aramco out of political necessity, but rather encouraged to take 
control of its oilfields due to changes in the oil market. 
 
Energy Crisis: This Time the Wolf if Here! 
In April 1973, the US State Department’s senior oil analyst, James Akins, who would later 
be appointed ambassador to Saudi Arabia, published a prescient piece in Foreign Policy, “The 
Oil Crisis: This Time the Wolf is Here.” Akins cited growing anti-Americanism in the Middle 
East, decreasing oil production in the US, and increasing dependency on foreign oil to argue, 
“the oil crisis is a reality…[it] compels urgent action.”70 Although the US had been a self-
sufficient “swing producer” for much of the early-to-mid twentieth century, having enough spare 
capacity to supply the Allied war effort during World War II, in the early 70s the US became 
dependent on foreign oil. This change rendered the country vulnerable to Arab political pressures 
at a time when the US benefited from the status quo of détente in the region.71 
Following WWII, the US experienced three decades of industrial expansion during which 
its demand for oil increased in tandem with an annual GDP growth of 6 percent.72 Not only 
because of industrial growth, demand for oil rose as its price decreased relative to all other fuels. 
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With expansion in the Middle East oil industry, overproduction in the global market outpaced 
supply to the point where low prices stimulated a virtuous cycle of demand.5 At the same time as 
US consumption reached an all time high, a number of actions on the part of public and private 
parties hurt domestic oil production. Because production in the Middle East did not require as 
much capital as in the US, most low-efficiency wells were hedged out of the market—despite the 
US government’s best efforts at curtailing imports. 73 In addition, oil companies neglected to 
build a single refinery in the US between 1960 and 1970, due to new environmental 
regulations.74 These factors coupled to make the US less productive at a time when global 
demand reached an all time high. In the three years prior to Atkins article alone, US imports 
nearly doubled—15 percent of which came from the Gulf [table 1.1].75 By allowing for the 
growth of multinational oil exploitation, the US government dug the grave for its domestic 
producers. Though low prices benefited global industrialization in the short run, they heightened 
dependence on oil in the long run and rendered oil consumers vulnerable to changes in the oil 
market. In 1972, demand finally outpaced supply, and the power to determine prices tipped in the 
favor of “sellers” over “buyers.”76 
While OPEC organized in 1960 to “secure fair and stable prices for [all] petroleum 
producers [and exporters],” OAPEC6 formed in the wake of the Six-Day War to unite Arab oil 
producers.77 At the time, Oil Minister Yamani claimed OAPEC would become “the EEC 
[European Economic Community] of the Arab oil producers.”78 As the oil market changed in the 
early 70s, Arab oil producers grew empowered to not only renegotiate prices, but take a more 
                                                
5 Supply outpaced demand as Middle East and Soviet oil industries developed and 
independent producers such as Italy’s ENI entered the market. 
6 Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC): Kingdom of Saudi 
 Arabia (1968), Kuwait (1968), Libya (1968), Algeria (1970), United Arab Emirates 
(1970), Bahrain (1970), Qatar (1970), Syria (1972), Iraq (1972), Egypt (1973). 
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active role in the production and marketing of their oil. Between December 1970 and before the 
outbreak of the October War in 1973, OAPEC’s negotiations with the seven largest oil 
companies, also known as the “Seven Sisters,” raised the “posted price”7 of oil by 70 percent, 
from $1.80 per barrel to $3.01 [graph 1.1].79 
In addition to market changes, oil producers grew empowered by their own development 
over the course of the mid-twentieth century. In a meeting with transnational oil executives in 
January 1972, Yamani explained, “When Aramco signed its agreement [1933], no Saudis had 
been to University and no Saudis had experience in the oil industry—now there are thousands of 
Saudi graduates and hundreds with experience in the oil industry.” Rather than use this 
information to argue for nationalization, however, Yamani and the KSA remained moderate in 
their request for “equity participation” with Aramco. Participation was conceived by Yamani to 
allow oil-producing countries to “share in the equity capital of their existing concessions” and 
reserve a percentage of oil to market locally.80 Distinct from nationalization, participation 
allowed oil producers to gradually acquire the skills necessary to manage their own oil 
production. Some producing countries, however, would not opt for such protracted transfers of 
power. 
 
Oil and Politics Mix 
With new radical regimes in states like Algeria, Libya, and Iraq and a new power 
dynamic in the international oil market, waves of nationalizations swept through the oil industry. 
                                                
7 Following the 50-50 Agreement of 1950, governments were allocated a 50% tax based 
on the “posted price” rather than royalties per barrel under the prior concession 
agreements. Instead of moving naturally with market prices, though, posted prices 
required negotiations. Before the Tehran Agreement in 1971, these negotiations favored 
oil companies, as governments faced barriers to entry in the market. 
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In February 1971, after price disputes with the French, the Algerian government nationalized 51 
percent of the French share. Ten months later, Libya’s Gaddafi nationalized all of BP’s assets on 
the grounds that the British had failed to prevent Iran from occupying Arab islands in the Persian 
Gulf. Iraq, lastly, nationalized the entire Iraq Petroleum Company’s (CFP) consortium in 1972 
after failing to acquire participation. Afterwards, the Iraqi government successfully marketed its 
oil to the French company, CFP, proving that the change in the oil market would prevent a loss 
in market share like that seen during the Iranian nationalization dispute. These events gave 
“moderate” countries all the more clout to push for higher prices and greater participation. In 
1972, Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi, Qatar, and Kuwait each acquired at least 20 percent 
participation with their concessions [graph 1.1]. 
Within this context of increasing economic power, Arab producers also began to wield 
increasing political power. On May 3, 1973, during one of his weekly courtesy calls with the 
CEO of Aramco, Frank Jungers, King Faisal requested that the US make a “simple disavowal of 
Israeli policies and actions” to avoid “having American interests thrown out of the area.” 
Although Saudi Arabia was able to “stand alone” as a US ally during the Six-Day War—the 
King had become increasingly aggravated by the US’ failure to uphold UN Resolution 242, 
which mandated the return of the Arab territories lost in in the war.81 Because the threats to 
Faisal’s survival had waned since Nasser’s demise—and Anwar Sadat’s expulsion of Soviet 
advisers from Egypt in 1972—the King was in a better position to make his political demands 
heard. Faisal did not view American support for Israel as a bulwark against communism in the 
Arab world, but the primary force behind its growth.82 
Despite the warning signs at home and abroad, most economic analysts and political 
commentators in the US failed to ring the alarm bells and adapt to the changing geopolitical 
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situation. One utterly misguided article published in US News and World Report, argued, for 
example, “America is becoming self-sufficient once again in oil.”83 Even the CIA, just days 
before the 1973 embargo would be imposed, submitted a report to the House of Representatives 
that claimed US dependence on Arab oil was a negligible 5 to 6 percent, when in reality it was 
closer to 15 percent.84  
The only parties that were attuned to the changing political and economic situation were, 
not surprisingly, transnational oil companies, as their existence was directly threatened. In 1969, 
the Vice President of Mobil Oil—which held a 33 percent share in Aramco—prepared a report 
for President Nixon, warning, “anti-American sentiment has put in serious jeopardy vital U.S. 
interests and investments.”85 Moses explained, US operations in the KSA provided balance of 
payments returns of “close to $2 billion” and an “even-handed policy” with respect to Israel 
would be the only means by which to retain them.86 At the same time, however, the CIA 
dismissed Faisal’s threats as mere attempts to appease political radicalism in the region, not 
examples of an economically and politically empowered KSA. Then again, growing increasingly 
anxious in June 1973, Mobil took up a full-page ad in the New York Times, approaching the 
public instead of the government, to warn that America was becoming increasingly dependent on 
foreign oil and it was “now time for the world to insist on a settlement in the Middle East.87 At 
the time, however, public opinion held oil companies in such low esteem, for their consumer-
squeezing reputation, that their warnings went largely unheeded. A well-known oil expert at 
MIT, Maurice Adelman, accused the oil companies of being the “agents of foreign power.”88  
In addition to negligence, the US government failed to adapt to the incipient crisis because 
it benefited from the status quo of détente in the region.89 Although newborn political currents 
grew up to replace Nasser after the Six-Day War, as far as the US government was concerned, 
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the political situation in the Middle East was far less threatening than before. Despite paying lip 
service to being “an honest broker acceptable to both [Israel and the Arabs],” Nixon thought the 
US could afford to remain close to Israel. Indeed, in diametric opposition to Faisal, Nixon still 
viewed Israel as the primary bulwark against communism in the Middle East.90  
In reaction to sustained inertia on the part of the US, Faisal met with Sadat at a session of 
the Arab Defense Council in January 1973 to grant the latter permission to spend Saudi subsidies 
on communist weapons. Seven months later, just weeks before the outbreak of the October War, 
Faisal told Sadat that he was prepared to cut oil production by 10 percent a year if American 
policy in the Middle East didn’t change.91 With the assured backing of Faisal and the support of 
Hafez al-Assad in Syria, on October 6th, Sadat led surprise attacks on Israel—to either reclaim 
the Arab territories lost during the Six-Day War or at least pressure a change in US foreign 
policy.92 When Nixon subsequently requested $2.2 billion for the resupply of Israel on October 
19th, King Faisal finally unleashed his power on the US. The next day the Saudi government 
announced, “in view of the increase of American military aid to Israel, the Kingdom of Saudi 











Table 1.1: US Imports of Crude Oil 1970-1974 (Thousand Barrels) 
    1970      1971     1972     1973     1974 




Graph 1.1: Changes in Nominal Oil Price 1970-2007 
https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pri_spt_s1_d.htm  
Graph Key: 
1. Tehran Agreement, 1970 
2. Geneva Agreement, 1972 
3. Participation Agreement, 1972 
4. 1st OPEC Unilateral Increase, 1973 




The Embargo: From Antagonism to Alignment 
Over the course of the next five months, the embargo wreaked havoc on oil-consuming 
economies, sowed division in the Atlantic Bloc, and bestowed unprecedented amounts of wealth 
and power upon Arab oil producers. In addition to the stoppage of oil exports to the US and the 
Netherlands,8 the Saudis lowered their overall production by 20 percent, triggering widespread 
speculation in the market and leading to an astronomical price rise around the globe.94 By 
December 23rd, OPEC grew empowered to quadruple the crude price to $11.65 per barrel, 
dwarfing the $2.00 price that had that had persisted for much of the mid-twentieth century.95 
That same month, a special mission report submitted to the US Committee on Foreign 
Affairs assessed the feasibility of occupying Saudi Arabian oil fields with military force.96 
Entitled “The United States Oil Shortage and The Arab-Israeli Conflict,” the report evaluated the 
effects of the October 1973 OAPEC oil embargo on the US economy and outlined a number of 
potential responses—some more aggressive than others. Although the US had failed to realize 
the full implications of the embargo prior to and immediately after its implementation, by 
December, its negative impact was obvious to all. Gas lines were piling up in the US, inflation 
and deficits were mounting around the globe, and the US was coming under increasing fire from 
its oil-consuming allies.97 As far as the Nixon administration was concerned, major geopolitical 
intervention was warranted, but as of December, a clear answer as to what kind remained to be 
seen. 
A hawkish few in the administration advocated for the use military force. Perhaps the 
most prominent among them, Defense Secretary Schlesinger spoke indignantly about the fact 
                                                
8 The Netherlands allowed the American resupply of Israel to embark from their airfields. 
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that “underdeveloped, underpopulated” countries like the KSA could deal such a powerful blow 
to the US; he wanted to see the oil fields under complete US military control.98 Hearing these 
rumors, Saudi Oil Minister Yamani threatened to light fire to Saudi oil installations, effectively 
widening the embargo to the whole of the industrial world.99 By late 1973, the KSA had 
accumulated such large amounts of petrodollar surpluses that it could survive for at least three 
years without a lick of oil revenue.100 
While more moderate than Schlesinger, Secretary of State Kissinger similarly denounced 
the Arabs’ use of “blackmail.” In January, he argued, “It becomes increasingly less appropriate 
for Arab governments to pursue discriminatory measures against the U.S. when the United States 
has publicly declared its support for Resolution 242 and has been the principal country 
prompting settlement in the area.”101 While the Nixon administration had initially ignored the 
risks posed by the oil weapon, once Israel secured a victory over the Soviet-backed Arab 
frontline states, Kissinger immediately began pursuing Arab-Israeli peace in an attempt to get the 
embargo lifted. Indeed, failure to do so would not only lead to the collapse of global capitalism, 
the Secretary worried, but risk the spread of communism in the Middle East, Western Europe, 
Japan, and the rest of the oil-dependent capitalist world.102 
This chapter argues that the geopolitical dangers posed by the embargo prompted the 
Nixon administration to take seriously the demands of Faisal and reassess the KSA’s position 
within its international framework of communist containment. At a time when the entire 
industrial world was starved for oil, the embargo threatened not just the stability of the US 
economy, but the economic and political viability of the entire Western bloc. Indeed, not since 
the Marshall Plan—perhaps the earliest form of Cold War containment—had economic factors 
posed such an immediate threat to the “free world.”103 Before dealing with the issue of high oil 
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prices, Kissinger had to first recognize the political demands of OAPEC and disengage Arab-
Israeli belligerents. To do so, Kissinger conducted “shuttle diplomacy” throughout the Middle 
East, meeting bilaterally with both frontline states and oil producers to play on the interests of 
individual countries and avoid making large-scale commitments. In this way, the US was able to 
gradually diminish Faisal’s political opposition to the US. Ultimately, then, the embargo directly 
contributed to the realignment between the US and KSA by raising the stakes of political 
cooperation. 
For the Saudis, the embargo elevated the Kingdom to a position of leadership in the 
region.104 Just as the Six-Day War had amplified anti-American sentiment in the Middle East, so 
too did the October War; this time, however, the Saudis were in a position to run with the stream 
of anti-imperial sentiments. At the same time, their new position of power demanded a military 
buildup. Not only did high oil prices increase the potential “spoils” for anti-regime dissidents, 
but it empowered some of the KSA’s nearby, oil-producing foes: Iraq and Iran.105 While Faisal 
wanted help developing his economy—due to its small, untrained workforce and low “absorption 
capacity”—he also needed help investing excess capital abroad.106 In these ways, the embargo 
directly heightened the KSA’s dependence on outside support. None of this made realignment 
between the US and KSA inevitable. Rather, by impacting the US’ policy of containment, the 
embargo eased political tension between the US and KSA and facilitated their reunion. 
This chapter analyzes the embargo in three parts: implementation, continuation, and 
resolution. While the embargo commenced with rhetorical and material distance between the US 
and KSA, it concluded with a retrenchment of ties. The first section shows how the KSA’s 
petroleum policy was originally rooted in oil market economics and became increasingly 
politicized as the US ramped up support for Israel. The next section analyzes the US’ political 
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and economic response to the embargo, which entailed changes in domestic energy policy as 
well as international diplomacy. The final section explains how the KSA acquired a new position 
of regional leadership and responded to the US’ changed foreign policy with its own change in 
oil policy. The sections are organized by focusing on either the US or KSA to replicate the 
communicative nature of economic warfare: at implementation, the embargo expressed Saudi 
political demands; during continuation, it prompted a US response; finally, just five months after 
its implementation, on March 18th 1974, the KSA ended the era of antagonism and ushered in a 
new era of alignment with the US. 
 
The Oil Weapon Unleashed 
The oil weapon was conceived by the Arab oil-producing states as a double-edged sword 
to first, stimulate domestic, oil-producing economies and, second, influence Arab-Israeli politics. 
In the market, as chapter 1 has shown, prior to the embargo’s implementation, demand for oil 
was on the rise, but prices remained arbitrarily low. Between just July and August, the US 
increased its total imports by 40 percent (doubling the amount coming from Saudi Arabia), but 
the posted price remained at $3.00 per barrel. Demand for Arab oil in Western Europe and Japan 
was even higher, representing 50 percent and 90 percent of total consumption respectively. 
Because demand was projected to continue to rise, moreover, producers like Saudi Arabia were 
incentivized to withhold production in the short term. Additionally, by the early 70s, most large 
producers—Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Kuwait for example—had larger inflows of capital than 
their small economies could absorb. Saudi Arabia, for one, a country of only seven million, 
began financing mosques and schools beyond its borders, giving aid to other economies like 
Egypt, and investing its remaining surpluses in foreign banks. In this context, the only way the 
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KSA and other wealthy producers would continue to widen the flow of oil was if consumers like 
the US granted political concessions. 
Two days after the October War erupted, on October 8th, delegates from the major oil 
companies met with representatives of OAPEC in Vienna to attempt their last mutual price 
negotiation. With the war underway, negotiations were tense. The oil ministers of Saudi Arabia 
and Iran, Sheikh Yamani and Dr. Amouzegar, claimed the annual price increase of 2.5 percent 
agreed upon in Tehran, two years prior, was inadequate to keep up with the high levels of 
inflation. The same inflationary pressures that had caused Nixon to dismantle the gold standard 
and disband the Bretton Woods system only escalated after the dollar was de-pegged from 
gold.107 Not only were comparable commodity imports from the industrial world becoming 
evermore expensive, but the oil market was itself indicating that the price of oil should be rising. 
Some independent oil companies were already auctioning off oil for as much as $5 per barrel. 
Considering these factors, Yamani and Amouzegar proposed for an immediate doubling of the 
posted price to $6 per barrel. The oil companies, on the other hand, represented by Piercy of 
Exxon and Bernard of Shell, responded with an offer to increase prices by a maximum of 25 
percent, ten times the amount agreed in Tehran at the last price negotiation. In the face of such 
intransigence, the OAPEC delegates decided to take power into their own hands and reconvene 
in Kuwait. Later, Yamani would remark, “[the oil companies] were happy with the higher prices 
because that meant more profits for them, but they didn’t want to be the ones to say yes.”108 
Indeed, as the last chapter showed, the US press was becoming increasingly critical of the oil 
companies’ failure to put the American people before profit. 
On October 16th, in Kuwait, the OAPEC delegates agreed to unilaterally raise the price of 
oil by 70 percent. The next day, they released a communiqué detailing their decision to also: 
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“reduce oil production forthwith by not less than 5 percent of the September (1973) 
level…until such a time as the total evacuation of Israeli forces from all Arab 
territory occupied during the June War is completed, and the legislative rights of the 
Palestinian people are restored.”109 
This meeting represented the first time the oil producing countries raised the price of oil without 
the approval of multinational oil firms. The CIA’s energy intelligence officer, Jim Critchfield, 
explained, “The situation presented [Arabs oil producers with] an opportunity to make money 
and be a patriot at the same time.”110 Indeed, the oil producers combined a price rise with a 
production cut to stimulate their own economies, in the first place, and apply political pressure to 
consumers in the latter. Deputy Secretary of State Rush summed up this situation a month later: 
“The Arabs can increase their prices and cut back their production levels, and still have more 
money than they did before.”111 Rather than resort to an immediate embargo, the Arab oil 
producers opted for a gradual, progressive production cut to ensure the long-term viability of 
political pressure. 
This policy alienated states like Iraq and Libya who had inherited parts of Nasser’s anti-
imperialist ideology. While Nasser and his Arab nationalist movements had subsided after the 
Six-Day War, as the last chapter explained, new radical leaders rose in the region. Iraq’s 
Hussein, for one, protested the Kuwaiti conference altogether, calling for the blanket 
nationalization of all US interests in the Middle East. Libya’s spokesman, Izz al-Din al-Mabruk, 
moreover, attended the Kuwaiti conference, but proposed expropriating every multinational oil 
company in the Middle East, not only those owned by US firms. In response, the Saudis and 
other Gulf producers heightened their own images of radicalism by arguing that production cuts 
were in fact more injurious to industrial states; nationalization implied only a change in who 
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profited from oil exportation, not a change in the amount of oil exported.112 Thus, in 1973 the 
oil-producing states experienced rivalries akin to those in 1967 between “revolutionary” and 
“reactionary” states, but this time Faisal assumed the leading role in opposing imperialism. 
Two days after the issuance of the Kuwaiti communiqué, when Nixon requested $2.2 
billion of aid to Israel from Congress, Faisal finally leveled complete opposition against the US 
and any other states “friendly” to Israel. Once he did, the rest of OAPEC quickly followed. 
Although the US had been sending minor airlifts to Israel since the 13th, in response to the 
Soviet’s resupply of Egypt and Syria, now that Nixon had requested such large amounts of aid in 
direct disregard for Faisal’s political warnings, the King was pushed to discontinue all petroleum 
shipments to the US. Like in 1967, Faisal balanced his own political opposition to the US with 
regional political opposition; this time, however, his heightened political and economic 
autonomy rendered opposition not only more genuine, but impactful. In order to continue 
relations, Faisal wanted to see the US become the primary broker for peace in the Arab world. 
 
Shuttle Diplomacy: Divide and Disengage 
The inability, on the part of the US, to prevent this crisis from unfolding was, as chapter 
one showed, rooted in the US’ static policy of containment in the Middle East, which habitually 
prioritized Israel. Once Nixon’s aid package helped Israel quickly crush the Soviet-backed Arab 
states, however, the US began seeking bilateral peace agreements and cozying up to individual 
states like Egypt and the KSA in an attempt to get the embargo lifted. By dealing with countries 
on an individual basis, the US could appeal to their national interests and avoid making full-scale 
commitments such as the full restoration of Palestinian rights. This section examines the US’ 
changed posture in the Arab world in response to the 1973 embargo. 
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When Egypt initiated a surprise attack on Israel on October 6th, to the Nixon 
administration, it appeared as if the Soviet-backed Arab states had a real chance in crushing the 
Israeli military. Nixon wrote in his memoir, “It was unthinkable that Israel should lose the war 
for lack of weapons.” 113 On October 14th, Kissinger wrote to Faisal, the US “had no alternative” 
but to begin an airlift of supplies following the Soviet “massive airlift of arms.”114 The Nixon 
administration was certain that it could not allow America’s primary Middle Eastern ally to be 
defeated by countries supported by the Soviet Union. Once Israel achieved a decisive victory 
over the Arab frontline states, however, Kissinger began negotiating ceasefire and 
disengagement agreements.115 
Although the US government had underestimated its reliance on Arab oil by as much as 
10 percent prior to the embargo, the import cutback coupled with a 70 percent price increase 
triggered an exponential spiral of speculation in the oil market and injured the fundamentals of 
the US economy. 116 By December, OPEC delegates met again to double the price of oil once 
more to $11.65 per barrel. 117  As a result, a host of industries, from manufacturing to 
transportation, experienced contraction and raised the price of their outputs as costs rose. The US 
entered a recession not seen since the Great Depression. GDP plunged 6 percent between 1973 
and 1975 and unemployment doubled to 9%.118 
Within a week of the embargo’s imposition, the US unveiled a rationing program under 
the header, Project Independence.119 While conservation would temporarily heighten the pressure 
inflicted by the oil weapon, it would simultaneously incentivize domestic production levels and 
give the US more power to negotiate with oil producers. Essentially, if the oil weapon induced 
the US to become more independent, the Arab oil producers could risk losing permanent market 
shares as they had back when the market favored “buyers.” In addition to Project Independence, 
 35 
a contraction in the US economy, a relatively warm winter, and increased imports from non-Arab 
oil producers ultimately rendered the impact of the embargo on the US less severe than other oil-
importing countries.120 
In addition to changes in domestic energy infrastructure, the US began to make 
“tangible” changes in its policy toward Israel, as Sheikh Yamani had recommended in 
November.121 In January, the US facilitated a disengagement agreement between Israel and 
Egypt. By mediating bilaterally, the US appealed to individual nations’ interests and avoided 
making large-scale commitments.122 While the Saudis supported Sadat in the October War on the 
grounds that he was fighting for Palestinian rights and the return of all the territories occupied in 
1967, the Egyptian president became appeased after the war with offers to reclaim individual 
segments of the Sinai. Since his expulsion of Soviet advisors from Egypt in 1972, Sadat had 
wanted to integrate with the US. The October War was his last effort to reclaim land and prestige 
for Egypt before making peace with Israel and cozying up to the US. The US took advantage of 
this situation by convincing Sadat it could not influence Israel to trade “land for peace” until the 
US was free from Arab “blackmail.” Thus, from November to March, Sadat ironically became 
one of the primary advocates behind the lifting of the embargo. As early as one week after the 
final October War ceasefire, Sadat visited Faisal in Riyadh to make a “formal and official” 
recommendation that Faisal gradually lift the embargo on oil shipments as the US made headway 
in its negotiations with Israel. 123 Although Sadat would not succeed for months, in January, 
when the US negotiated the Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai, Sadat wrote to Nixon, “I am glad 
to inform you that…King Faisal has agreed to lift the embargo.”124 Despite this gesture of good 
will, further diplomatic efforts were required before the embargo could finally be lifted in March. 
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Although Faisal may have agreed to lift the embargo in a private meeting with Sadat, the 
reality was, OAPEC’s political demands were still unmet. In light of the US’ even-handed 
approach in the peace process with Egypt, the oil producers had watered down their demands 
promulgated in Kuwait in October, but they still wanted to see an end to hostilities between 
Israel and Syria before terminating the embargo. In response, the US argued again that it could 
not influence Israel if its actions were thought to be dictated by OAPEC. The US warned, 
moreover, that the embargo would undermine the its government’s legitimacy at home, damage 
the favorability of Arab countries in the eyes of the American public and Congress, and empower 
the Soviets insofar as it weakened the economies of non-communist states. The notion that the 
US could not negotiate if its actions were thought to be dictated by OAPEC resonated most 
Faisal. By February, the leaders of OAPEC called to lift the embargo “unconditionally” so that 
the US might attain a stronger bargaining position with respect to Israel. Rather than ask the US 
to “pay anything,” Foreign Minister Fahmi of Egypt and Saqqaf of Saudi Arabia told Kissinger 
and Nixon, “If you want to play a role, play it because it is right.”125 Of course, the newfound 
trust in the US was only granted on “the pretext that it had changed its policy toward the Arab 
issue.”126 Still, what was described as an “unconditional” lifting was, in reality, contingent upon 
the United States’ continued efforts to disengage Israel and Syria. 
On this front, Kissinger had doubts about the United States’ ability to deliver, especially 
in the short timeframe OAPEC was pushing for. Assad was a more radical leader than Sadat and 
he had ambitions in the Golan Heights that exceeded what Kissinger thought the Israeli 
government would concede. Thus, instead of pleasing all the OAPEC ministers, Kissinger 
thought he might be able to coopt the most important, King Faisal. As early as November, Faisal 
had begun backing down from his principled stance against Israeli control of East Jerusalem, but 
 37 
he still feared that any concessions to the US might amplify the “pressure he was under from the 
radicals, Yemen and Iraq.”127 As in 1967, Faisal used the threats to his regime as justification for 
its continued opposition to the US, regardless of his own feelings. While Kissinger tried to 
eliminate the political pressure on the Saudi regime by negotiating bilateral peace agreements 
throughout the region, he knew an agreement with Syria would be slow to come. Thus, in 
addition to shuttle diplomacy, Kissinger attempted to appease Faisal with economic and military 
deals that would help strengthen the latter’s regime in the face of potential opposition.  
In early March, just three weeks before the lifting of the embargo, Kissinger met with 
Faisal in Riyadh to explain, “[W]e are prepared to begin talking about long-term cooperation in 
the military field, in the economic field, and in the scientific field.”128 The King responded, “We 
are certainly prepared to do so. At the same time we hope you will succeed in eradicating the 
problem of the dispute between the Arab States and Israel so that that frees us to devote all the 
time in pursuit of this objective.”129 In this way, the United States’ attempt to realize Saudi 
political demands was a major contributing factor to the reification of ties between the two 
countries.  
 
A Position of Leadership 
At the same time as the embargo transformed the United States’ position on the Arab-
Israeli crisis, it irrevocably altered the political status of the KSA. Most obviously, the 
Kingdom’s oil revenues skyrocketed from $4 billion to over $19 billion [see table].130 New 
wealth encouraged the Kingdom to expand its state capacity and coercive apparatus, modernize 
its economy, and “buy-off” political consensus.131 Additionally, the Kingdom expanded its 
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“checkbook diplomacy” in the Arab world, committing an annual contribution of $2.5 billion to 
the frontline states at the Rabat Summit in 1974.132 
At the same time, large sums of oil wealth brought added insecurity. Greater oil wealth, 
for one, “present[ed] an attractive set of spoils to potential rebels.”133  These spoils had 
repercussions for both domestic and regional security. Internally, as perceptions of inequality 
grew, so too did the probability of dissent. In the region, the Kingdom worried its oilfields would 
become prime targets for oppositional regimes. While the rising Baath regime in Iraq and the 
communist party in South Yemen presented the most pressing threats, Iran’s growing power was 
also ominous.  
As chapter one explained, the communist regime in South Yemen threatened the stability 
of not only North Yemen, Oman, and other Gulf states, but the stability of the Kingdom itself. 
The threats from Iraq and Iran, on other hand, became more pressing after the embargo. As oil 
prices increased, the revenues of not only the KSA, but its oil-producing opponents widened.134 
Having much larger populations than Saudi Arabia, moreover, Iraq and Iran could more readily 
translate their wealth into military superiority. Between 1973 and 1974, for example, the quantity 
of medium tanks in Iran and Iraq grew from 920 and 990 to 1,160 and 1,390, respectively, while 
the Saudi stockpile increased from only 25 to 55.135  
While both countries posed threats to the KSA’s overall power in the Gulf, Iraq 
represented the larger of the two. The former not only espoused Arab Socialism at home, but laid 
claim to territories in Kuwait and incited Arab Socialist parties throughout the Gulf, such as the 
PFLOAG in Oman. 136 Iran, on the other hand, opposed the Iraqi regime and communism more 
broadly. In early 1974, for example, Iran stationed a full combat brigade and air force unit in 
Oman to support sultan Said bin Taimur against the PFLOAG rebels.137 Although the Kingdom’s 
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interests temporarily converged with those of Iran, this did not guarantee continued 
convergences, especially as concerns mounted over Iran’s depleting oil reserves. Thus, after the 
embargo, a complicated picture emerged in which the Saudis new position of wealth and 




















































Imperialism through Commission:  
The US-Saudi Relationship After the Embargo 
 
On June 6th, a week after the US facilitated disengagement between Israel and Syria, 
Kissinger met with Saudi Arabia’s Prince Fahd in Washington to move forward with their 
“special relationship.”138 After two days of roundtable discussions, the officials announced a 
decision to establish two new commissions, which would oversee the exchange of goods, labor, 
and capital for decades to come: the Joint Commission on Security Cooperation (JSCOR) and the 
Joint Commission on Economic Cooperation (JECOR). Over the next decade alone, the 
commissions accounted for exchanges worth well over $60 billion. In The House of Saud, David 
Holden and Richard Johns described JECOR as “the most far-reaching agreement of its kind ever 
concluded by the US with a developing country. It had the potential to entrench the US deeply in 
the Kingdom, fortifying the concept of mutual interdependence.”139  
This chapter moves beyond notions of “interdependence” to explore the power 
imbalances in the US-Saudi relationship after the embargo. While the US government saw access 
to Saudi oil as necessary for its continued hegemony in the “free world,” the House of Saud’s 
very survival came to depend on economic and military support from the outside.140 While the 
embargo empowered the KSA to take control of its oil production, the added insecurities 
accompanying political and economic leadership intensified the Kingdom’s reliance on the 
outside support. For the US, the embargo heightened the stakes of US-Saudi relations and pushed 
it to actively leverage its military and economic superiority at a time when the KSA began 
trading with other industrial powers. This chapter describes the Joint Commissions as neo-
imperial insofar as they originated in unequal, though symbiotic government-to-government 
interaction. The first section of this chapter explores the US’ view of the world after the 
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embargo, while the latter sections examine how the US capitalized on Saudi demands for 
military “modernization,” economic diversification, and foreign investments. 141 
 
The Price Problem 
Less than a week after the termination of the embargo on March 18th, Kissinger met with 
representatives of a number of major oil companies to discuss the lingering problem of high oil 
prices. 142 While the renewed shipment of 600,000 barrels of Saudi crude per day had significant 
weight in bringing the US and KSA closer together143, it could not reverse the damage already 
inflicted on industrial economies.144 In his meeting with Kissinger, Chairman Jamieson of Exxon 
explained, “the price problem is more critical than the supply problem.”145 By diminishing the 
global oil supply relative to demand, the embargo and concomitant production cuts directly 
empowered OPEC to raise prices to $11.65 per barrel. 146 This move, more than the embargo 
itself, put a drain on the US dollar, forced its allies to compete for bilateral deals with oil 
producers, and pushed its oil-dependent creditors, primarily LDCs9, into bankruptcy. Together, 
these factors risked spiraling the entire oil-consuming world into a recession the depth of which 
had not been seen since the Great Depression.147 In language that harkened back to the Marshall 
Plan and Truman Doctrine, Kissinger worried that a weakened Western Bloc would subject them 
to “influence from radical left and right wing political forces.”148 In this context, Kissinger 
devised a way to capitalize on Saudi military and economic needs and “crack the oil cartel and 
bring oil prices down.”149 
While prior scholars such as Gause and Bronson have described US-Saudi cooperation in 
terms of Nixon’s regional strategy of military containment, the records demonstrate that after the 
                                                
9 Late developing countries. 
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embargo, the United States coopted Saudi Arabia for the express purpose of lowering oil prices, 
which would only indirectly stabilize non-communist countries around the globe. 150  At a 
meeting with economic advisors, Kissinger explained his thinking on Joint Commissions: “I 
want to make it absolutely clear…we want to crack the oil cartel.” The US would accomplish 
this by “get[ting] them to invest in large scale development projects…[so that] production cuts 
that produce revenue losses will hurt the producing countries seriously.”151 In other words, the 
US would encourage OAPEC’s largest member to purchase US arms, technology, and bonds, so 
that it would rely on high levels of oil production and deter OAPEC from orchestrating any cuts 
in the future. The Secretary of Treasury, William Simon, explained further, “If production 
doesn’t get cut oil prices [will] drop by 30%.”152 With oil prices on the decline, finally, Kissinger 
reasoned, “influence from radical left and right wing political forces” would also diminish.153 
Though this indirect form of price control paled in comparison with the Seven Sister’s essential 
monopoly over prices in the 50s and 60s, the absorption of Saudi petrodollars would at least give 
the US government some material control over Saudi oil production. 
Despite the United States’ clear interest in the KSA, there was nothing inevitable about 
the latter’s realignment with the US. After the embargo, the Kingdom needed to “modernize” its 
military—to defend against empowered movements in Iraq, Iran, and Yemen—and develop and 
diversify its economy—to safeguard against potential downturns in the oil market—but it now 
had more autonomy to garner support from other industrialized states.154 Indeed, since the OPEC 
price hike, a number of industrialized states—France, Germany, and Japan—had offered the 
KSA military and economic technologies in direct exchange for large sums of crude. These deals 
gave more power to the Saudis in both its relations with the US government and Aramco: it 
reduced the Saudis’ reliance on US arms and allowed them to market their crude beyond the 
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bounds of Aramco’s distribution networks. With more cash flowing in and petroleum flowing 
out, the KSA was empowered to purchase 60 percent of Aramco’s equity in August—up from 25 
percent—and acquire the rest by 1980.155 
More important than its impact on Saudi marketing abilities, bartering posed a threat to 
the US because it “put a floor under prices.”156 While the private owners of Aramco did not 
oppose higher oil prices—because it increased profits and enabled oil exploration in more costly 
locations—the Nixon administration was worried that high prices incited “radical left and right 
wing political forces” in Europe.157 Rather than focus on the impact high prices had on the US 
economy, Deputy Secretary Rush explained, the Europeans were “hurting themselves most of 
all” by competing in a race to the top for trade deals.158 Thus, bilateralism in the KSA was not a 
problem because it directly damaged the US, but because it stifled European economies and 
risked undermining American hegemony in the non-communist world. 
For these reasons, Kissinger had been advocating for an Integrated Energy Policy (IEP) 
since February, when he invited the oil-consuming nations to the Washington Energy 
Conference. The purpose of the IEP was to organize energy sharing and prevent a reversion to 
European autarky like that seen during the Great Depression.159 Despite Kissinger’s multilateral 
vision, some members opposed the IEP for fear of engendering “political confrontation between 
consumers and producers.” Ironically, the French—who had invaded Egypt in 1956 when Nasser 
nationalized the Suez Canal—were the foremost critics of Kissinger’s policy. They blamed the 
US for provoking the oil cartel in October, and suspected that it would continue to act on its own 
impulses—due to its smaller relative reliance on foreign oil. 160 Even after the US demonstrated 
its ability to negotiate with oil producers, persuading them to lift the embargo in March, France 
remained intransigent. In July, when the French Foreign Minister met with Kissinger, 
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Sauvagnargue remarked, “You are the United States…you can afford to antagonize the 
Arabs.”161  
When multilateralism failed, Kissinger had no qualms about resorting to Cold Warrior 
realism. In his memoir, the Secretary wrote, “If France insisted on freedom of action in the 
Middle East, refused to participate in a consumer grouping on energy, and saw no point in any 
Atlantic declaration, little was left of the Atlantic dialogue.”162 In August 1974, the Secretary’s 
rhetoric proved more candid. Kissinger told top economic advisors, “We need to preempt the 
goddamn Europeans out of [the KSA].”163 In the same way that the US viewed political 
containment around the globe as a zero-sum game with the Soviets, the Nixon administration 
came to conceive of the Saudi economy as a zero-sum game between industrialized powers. Just 
as the superpower justified its confrontation with the USSR in terms of the interests of the entire 
“free world,” moreover, its bilateralism with Saudi Arabia was seen as instrumental to bringing 
down the price of oil for the benefit of all non-communist economies. The next section illustrates 
how the US leveraged its military superiority to advance bilateralism in the KSA. 
 
The New Search for Security  
Though the embargo created new security threats for the KSA [see chapter 2, section 3], 
its continued reliance on the US was not guaranteed. As stated above, the Saudis experimented 
with garnering military support from other industrialized states. One deal, in particular, included 
the order of 550 tanks and 450 aircraft missiles from France in exchange for $65 million worth 
of crude.164 This development constituted just one of the many post-embargo bartering deals that 
caused alarm in the Nixon administration.165 In this context, the US leveraged the superiority of 
its military to ensure continued access to Saudi oil.  
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Just weeks after the embargo ended, Kissinger summed up the United States’ dominant 
military position: 
“No one else can give [the Saudis] the intelligence, no one else can give them 
the political support they need, no one else can give them the military support 
they need. These are three assets we have that no one else can give them. The 
French can talk about what they want. But when Iraq and South Yemen start 
cooperating, we have got to be there.”166 
Indeed, in 1974, American defense expenditures were more than ten times greater than France, 
and its global exports outsized the latter’s by a factor of six. 167 American exports to the KSA, 
furthermore, were six times greater than those of the next largest supplier, the UK [see table 1]. 
168  
Ultimately, while other industrialized states could trade weapons for a limited supply of 
Saudi crude, the US was the only state capable of fully equipping and, more important, training 
the Saudi military. Indeed, the Saudis not only requested an upgrade for their small military, but 
a guarantee that a strong state would prop them up if and when, “Iraq and South Yemen start[ed] 
cooperating.” While the British had withdrawn their military presence in the Gulf in 1971 due to 
balance of payments issues—and the rest of the industrialized world grew even more indebted 
during the oil crisis—the US was relatively unburdened by debt and able to intervene in the Gulf 
in a crisis. As the Vietnam War wound down, finally, the US acquired spare military capacity to 
uplift other proxies. 
In mid-April, the Saudis agreed to purchase more than $270 million worth of surface-to-
air and air-to-ground missiles from the US and paid the American Defense Department $335 
million to train the Saudi National Guard.169 The two states also agreed to meet in the summer 
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and discuss further opportunities for military cooperation, assuming the US would succeed in 
disengaging Syria and Israel.170 By adding a condition to continued collaboration, the Saudis 
maintained political pressure on the US while simultaneously strengthening military and 
economic ties. Indeed, in the same way that Faisal had held a “stick” up to the US during the 
embargo to influence its foreign policy, the King now tried to hold influence over the US with a 
“carrot.”171 
Not surprisingly, one week after Israel agreed to withdraw from the Golan Heights on 
May 31st, Prince Fahd met with Kissinger in his conference room at the State Department to 
discuss their ongoing efforts to “moderniz[e] Saudi Arabia’s armed forces.” While Fahd 
expressed concerns about the KSA’s nearby threats—in Yemen and Iraq—he also requested that 
the US give aid to friendly states such as Jordan and Oman. Kissinger, for his part, offered token 
assurance that the United States “shares with the Saudis an interest in stability in the Arabian 
Peninsula and Persian Gulf.” 172 Two days later, the two signed a “Joint Statement on Saudi 
Arabian-United States Cooperation,” prescribing for a joint committee to “review programs 
already underway for modernizing Saudi Arabia’s armed forces…especially as they relate to 
training.”173 Over the next decade, dozens of military deals conducted under the review of the 
Joint Commission would account for approximately $8.8 billion in exchanges [see table 2]. 
These deals included the sale of anti-tank missiles, towed guns, aircrafts, transport tankers, and 
the training of Saudi pilots in US’ own military schools [see table 3].174 
Although Kissinger continually emphasized the United States commitment to 
containment in the Gulf, it was clear that “[the Saudis] were more anti-communist [in the Gulf] 
than the Americans.”175 Military deals with the KSA were encouraged insofar as they tied up 
Saudi revenue streams, encouraged high levels of production, and prevented the further 
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destabilization of Western economies, but they were not necessary for the direct containment of 
communism in the Gulf. Indeed, after Israel crushed the Soviet-backed Arab states, and the US 
succeeded in mediating Arab-Israeli peace, communism was perceived to be on the decline in the 
Arab world. In June, even Saudi Foreign Minister Saqqaf admitted, “aside from some pockets, 
who are radical communists or under Russian domination, now everyone in the Middle East has 
trust in you.”176 To deal with the pockets that were still “radical,” the US had already elected Iran 
as the “Big Pillar”—despite the United States’ alleged “twin-pillar” policy of containment in 
thee Gulf.177 Throughout the 60s, the US provided Iran with billions more dollars worth of arms 
than the KSA, due to its larger military, and the discrepancy only widened after the embargo 
[table 1].178 While the US leveraged its military superiority to capitalize on the KSA’s military 
needs, this move was less to empower another proxy in the Gulf, and more to “crack the oil 
cartel and bring oil prices down.”179 Even so, because the KSA could not possibly acquire 
enough US arms to utilize all $20 billion of its surpluses, the next section illustrates how the US 
government leveraged its economic power to tie up additional petrodollars. 
 
Develop and Diversify 
The US attracted additional Saudi petrodollars by capitalizing on the Saudis’ 
developmental needs. Since his assumption of power in 1964, Faisal had been trying to diversify 
the Saudi economy and “join the modern world.”180 In 1966 the King explained: 
“We are going ahead with extensive planning, guided by our Islamic laws and 
belief, for the progress of the nation…We have chosen an economic system based 
on free enterprise because it…suits our country by granting every opportunity to 
the people…to work for the common group. This doesn’t mean leaving 
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everything unchecked, for we will interfere when the Government finds it 
necessary to do so.181 
Because the Saudi market incentivized investment in the comparatively advantageous sector of 
oil, much of the Kingdom’s economy was left underdeveloped and in need of government 
intervention. Depending too heavily on oil revenues not only left the KSA vulnerable to 
volatility, but made it more difficult to translate oil surpluses into long-term economic growth. 
Indeed, a lack of infrastructure and a well-trained workforce rendered the KSA’s “absorption 
capacity” insufficient to handle large inflows of oil wealth.182 In 1970, therefore, Faisal initiated 
the KSA’s First Five-Year Development Plan to:  
“assure the defense and internal security of the Kingdom…reduce economic 
dependence on the export of crude oil…develop human resources by 
education…[and] develop the physical infrastructure to support the achievement 
of the above goals.”183 
The development of human capital was especially important for Faisal. In 1966, Oil Minister 
Yamani explained, “[the KSA] needs and welcomes foreign capital, particularly…if the capital is 
accompanied by technical know-how and marketing ability.”184 In 1970, the King echoed, “It is 
within our power…to erect an enormous plant—but can we run the plant properly to get the 
desired results from it?”185 Though the investment atmosphere in the Kingdom turned sour 
during the embargo—as threats of nationalization swept the Middle East—the wealth generated 
as a result heightened the urgency of development in the KSA while raising the stakes for US 
investment.186 
In this context, the US attracted additional petrodollar surpluses by encouraging the KSA 
to invest through JECOR. Mobilizing both private transnational firms and public institutions, the 
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US government offered to facilitate the development of the KSA’s administrative capacities—
vocational training, census gathering, customs assistance, and data processing—infrastructure—
electrification and highway construction—and industries—petrochemical, desalination, and 
solar, to name a few [see table 4].187 Over the next four years, the KSA’s total investments in 
these projects amounted to $776 million [see table 4].188 
While these contracts helped the Saudis “join the modern world,” they simultaneously 
“maximize[ed] payouts to US firms and ma[de] Saudi Arabia increasingly dependent on the 
United States,” as one participant explained. 189  Applying Kissinger’s logic, however, the 
maximization of payout was not an end in itself, but a means to tying up Saudi revenues. Though 
the US government would not have viewed corporate profits in a negative light, there is no 
evidence that the US “encourage[d] greater Saudi revenues as large-scale capitalist development 
benefited imperials,” as Fred Halliday has argued.190 To the contrary, the majority of contracts 
signed under JECOR were not delegated to private transnational firms, but public institutions 
[see table 4]. If anything, the US government used JECOR not to increase revenues, but temper 
the downward pressure on oil production generated by high revenues. Because the US 
government was involved in indirectly controlling Saudi oil after the embargo, the relationship 
can be framed as neo-imperial. Once again, however, JECOR could not succeed in absorbing the 
total amount of Saudi surpluses, due to the low “absorption capacity” of the Saudi state. In this 
way, the same scarcity of labor and infrastructure that prompted Saudi modernization in the first 
place was also the major hindrance to its development. To tie up the rest of the Kingdom’s 




Petrodollar Recycling and the New International Monetary System 
The memorandum given to Nixon before his meeting with Prince Fahd in June explained, 
“The Saudis face the question of how to handle rapidly accumulating monetary reserves.”191 
While the previous sections explored the KSA’s long-term goals for military modernization and 
economic development, this section deals with the KSA’s immediate investment needs. Between 
1973 and 1982, it was estimated that the Kingdom would accumulate more than $200 billion in 
surpluses. Even before the massive increase in oil price in December, the head of Saudi Arabia’s 
central bank, Anwar Ali, had exclaimed, “we are sinking under a sea of billions of dollars.”192 
After the embargo, Ali said: 
“International cooperation on a broad scale will be necessary to minimize the 
disruptive effects of a massive accumulation of foreign reserves…We realize it is 
our advantage to handle our surplus funds in a manner that does not disrupt the 
system. Stability is as important to us as it is to the Western World. You must 
help us by providing opportunities for us to invest our surplus funds.”193 
In response, the US government, namely Secretaries Kissinger and Simon, offered the Saudis 
attractive “add-on” arrangements to recycle their petrodollars directly into the US Treasury. This 
arrangement not only contributed to the US’ project of stabilizing the “free world,” but directly 
reified its hegemony in the international monetary system. 
Though Secretary Kissinger originally wanted to recycle petrodollars multilaterally, once 
again there was disunity in the Atlantic Bloc. At a meeting with OECD counties, the Secretary 
argued, “We must arrange borrowing and lending among ourselves so that the petrodollar reflow 
becomes more flexible. We should do this however without the producer countries in order to 
avoid political leverage by them over us.”194 Like Kissinger’s attempt at an Integrated Energy 
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Policy, however, the Secretary’s proposition for a capital Safety Net never came to fruition over 
suspicions that the US would act in its own favor.195 To prevent competition over petrodollar 
recycling, Kissinger and Secretary Simon devised a plan to use JECOR to funnel petrodollars 
directly into the US Treasury, from which they could then redistribute capital to the debt-ridden 
countries of the world. Even so, credit alone would not be enough to solve the fundamental 
capital disequilibrium between oil producers and consumers—only decreased demand and low 
prices could do that. Thus, the Secretaries conceived of a way for the interest gained on US 
Treasury investments to be rechanneled into developmental projects under JECOR.196 In this 
way, all three kinds of bilateral petrodollar recycling—arms sales, economic development, and 
treasury investments—would put upward pressure on oil production in the KSA. 
Though they worked together to devise the petrodollar recycling mechanism, Secretary 
Simon’s intentions went one step further than Kissinger’s in advancing the unilateral interests of 
the United States. The Secretary of Treasury was a hardline neoclassical economist. 
Domestically, he pushed Nixon to cut welfare services and defund social security. Most of all, he 
worried that if the US “continued to debase [its] currency…[it would bring] financial 
collapse.” 197  Since the dissolution of the Bretton Woods system in 1971—when global 
imbalances between the dollar and gold became too great—the dollar began inflating at 
unprecedented rates, endangering the stability of the US economy and encouraging the usage of 
alternative currencies in international trade. 198 By encouraging the Saudis to recycle petrodollars 
into the US Treasury, the Secretary sought to introduce a new “black gold” standard and curb 
runaway devaluation.199 
Despite the benefits Kissinger and Williams saw in petrodollar recycling, other US 
officials, such as Senator Ribicoff, worried that the maintenance of a strong dollar privileged 
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financial investments in the US at the expense of industrial exports—at a time when other 
industrial states were experimenting with competitive devaluation.200 Additionally, Ribicoff took 
issue with recycling over the fact that it would “burden [the US with] being creditor and banker 
to all the other oil-consuming nations in Europe and the Third World.”201 While this was exactly 
the Secretaries’ intent, those in the anti-recycling camp wanted to see the KSA and other oil 
producers take responsibility for devastating oil-dependents and take on the risks of keeping 
them solvent. Once again, the increase in global oil prices not only harmed members of the 
Atlantic Bloc, but a host of new “fourth world” countries, the latter of which were estimated to 
need $1.5 billion in credit.202 
In July, nevertheless, Simon traveled to Riyadh to “open…the working committees…of 
this joint committee” and advance his and Kissinger’s monetary agenda.203 Just as Kissinger had 
leveraged American military superiority to attract Saudi arms purchases, Simon leveraged the 
superiority of American financial markets to attract Saudi investments. By the summer of 1974, 
despite the onset of an energy-related recession, the US economy was doing remarkably well 
relative to other industrialized states. The US not only had less debt than most other industrial 
economies, but offered the highest relative interest rates on its bonds [table 3.5]. Simply put, 
American financial markets were not only the most secure option for the Saudis, but the most 
profitable. 
Beyond having a structurally sound economy, the US Secretary actively incentivized 
investments in the US Treasury by offering privileged “add-on” arrangements. Under these deals, 
the Saudis would be allowed to purchase bonds both in “secret”—a key prescription by Faisal—
and outside the bounds of the market.204 While the bond market would usually react to an 
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increase in demand by raising the price and lowering the interest rate, the Saudis were given 
static “add-on” offers at above-market rates. 205  
Though the contents of Simon and Faisal’s meeting remain inaccessible, afterward the 
Secretary informed the press that the Saudis agreed to purchase US bonds “well in excess of $5 
billion.”206 By 1979, these investments were estimated to reach $59 billion [Graph 1.C].10207 
Such large commitments must be attributed to the stability and profitability of US “add-on” 
agreements. Indeed, in the same year that the US and KSA signed the Joint Commissions, the 
head of Saudi Arabia’s central bank made explicit: “Stability is as important to us as it is to the 
Western World. You must help us by providing opportunities for us to invest our surplus 
funds”208 While the KSA would ultimately loan the IMF $1.2 billion and fund its own 
development bank with $3 billion, an estimated 70 percent of Saudi assets ended up in the most 


















                                                
10 45 percent of the Saudi surplus was reinvested in US banks and 30 percent was placed 




Table 3.1: Arms Exports to Saudi Arabia, 1968-1975 (expressed in US$ m. at constant 
(1990) prices) 
 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 Total 
France 8 49 49     65 172 
Germany 
(FRG) 
 53       53 
Italy 35 35       70 
Switzerland        30 30 
United 
Kingdom 
249 246 5 10 21 25   556 
United 
States 
164    80 157 368 372 1140 
Total 456 383 54 10 101 182 368 467 2019 
Source: http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/html/export_values.php 
 
Table 3.2: Arms Exports to KSA from US (expressed in US$ m. at constant (1990) 
prices) 
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 Total 
157 368 372 377 749 829 499 640 1310 1871 1630 8800 
Source: http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/html/export_values.php 
 
Table 3.3: Transfers of Major Conventional Weapons from US to KSA 
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Source: http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/trade_register.php  
Table 3.4: Formal Project Agreements as of September 30, 1978 
Project Value (millions) US Participants Staff 
Statistics and data 
processing 























Electrical Services 24 
 
























































Ford, Powell and 











Energy and Solar 
Energy Research 
Institute 
            0 
Auditing assistance 10 Treasury             0 
Customs assistance 15 Treasury             0 
Central procurement 12  GSA             0 




Total           $776  133 
Source: http://www.gao.gov/assets/130/126054.pdf  
Table 3.5: Real Interest Rate (%) in FRA, USA, GBR, JPN 
 1971 1972 1973 1974 
France 1.0 -0.4 0.7 0.1 
United States 0.6 0.9 2.4 1.7 
United 
Kingdom 
-0.5 0.3 -0.4 -5.3 








Do Petrodollars and Politics Mix? 
The singing of JSCOR and JECOR marked the beginning of a new imperial relationship 
that would last for decades to come. Though the Saudis had been subject to transnational 
penetration since the signing of their first concession with SoCal in 1933, four decades onward, 
the KSA grew empowered to assert control over its natural resource and deal with the US 
government on more direct terms.210 By igniting Saudi oil revenues and raising the US’ stake in 
oil price and production, the embargo facilitated new, more direct forms of political 
communication and economic cooperation. Despite the symbiosis of the two states’ realignment, 
their goals remained disjuncture and imbalanced. While the Saudis saw access to US military 
support, economic development, and foreign investments as necessary insurance against a 
potentially volatile position of political and economic leadership, the US saw access to Saudi oil 
as constitutive of its continued protection and control of the entire “free world.”  
In much the same way that the 1973 oil embargo enabled ruptures and continuities in the 
US-Saudi relationship, significant changes in the international oil market and geopolitical 
climate in recent decades have altered, but not ended the terms on which the US and KSA relate. 
While some of their fundamental material associations have grown stronger than ever—the KSA 
is now the largest market for US arms and the US has become the KSA’s second largest 
consumer of crude—the two states’ now deal on more lopsided terms. Most significant, while the 
KSA has increasingly depended on US arms with each new outbreak of conflict in the Middle 
East—from the Iran-Iraq War and the First Gulf War to the “War on Terror” and the current 
“New Middle East Cold War”211—US hegemony no longer depends on access to Saudi oil 
production to counter the “spectre of communism.”212213 Distinct from the moment when Arab 
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oil producers first became “masters of [their] own commodity,” domestic oil producers in the US 
have now mastered the technique of hydraulic fracturing and glutted the world with oil. 214 In 
today’s oil market, like that of the failed 1967 embargo, any cuts in Saudi oil production do not 
hurt consumers, but simply facilitate the expansion of US shale production.215 Indeed, rather than 
gain power through production cuts, the Saudis have recently maintained high levels of oil 
production to damage their regional rival in Iran and force more capital-intensive American 
oilrigs out of the market.216 Though Iran and Saudi Arabia agreed in November to curb 
production by 1.2 million barrels per day, the subsequent price increases led to an immediate 
increase in US shale output.217218 Thus, even if the US represents the KSA’s second largest crude 
consumer, it is now far less reliant on Saudi oil. 
For the KSA, on the other hand, continued access to US arms has remained an existential 
necessity. In 2011, after sweeping through Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt, the Arab Spring uprisings 
risked destabilizing the KSA’s neighbor, Bahrain, and inciting its domestic Shia population.219 
Though the Kingdom was easily able to quell dissent with US tanks, more long-term tensions 
with Iran have culminated in proxy wars in Yemen, Iraq, and Syria.220 Accordingly, the 
Kingdom has steadily increased its US arms purchases from $397 million in 2011 to $1.9 billion 
in 2016. Though the US continues to support the KSA for its efforts in combatting extremism in 
the region, neither Iran’s rise nor terrorism can be said to constitute an immediate existential 
threat to the US.221  
The fact that the Obama administration both agreed to a nuclear deal with Iran in 2015 
and refused to sell the Saudis missiles in the last months of its tenure testify to the recent 
divergences in US-Saudi security concerns.222 In 2016, when asked about the current state of US-
Saudi relations, President Obama responded, “It’s complicated.”223 Although Trump recently 
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went back on Obama’s obstruction of arms sales, there is no indication that the current threats to 
Saudi security constitute as large a threat to the US. Though the “War on Terror” certainly plays 
a large role in the US’ support of Saudi Arabia, the question remains: why did the US export 
$3.5 billion to the KSA last year? Though a definitive answer would require research beyond the 
bounds of this thesis, defense lobbyist, Michael Herson, has offered a potential explanation. 
Herson claims:  
“Our military doesn’t buy enough to keep many of our production lines open 
anymore…The problem is that if they don’t buy from us…they’ll turn and buy 
Chinese and Russian equipment. It’s a concern not only as a threat to our 
industrial base, but from a foreign policy standpoint.”224  
In this way, the logic of the military-industrial complex may now constitute a greater share of US 
motives, compared to the era in which Kissinger had an obsession with “cracking the cartel.” 
Whether or not the US government has become more classically imperial in its search for arms 
markets, the fact remains: US-Saudi government-to-government relations remain stronger than 
ever in the area of security, if not more imbalanced. 
On the flipside, the degree of government involvement in the sphere of non-military 
exports has declined significantly. Despite its importance at inception, “JECOR went out of 
business,” Thomas Lippman explains, “with no formal announcement by either country, at the 
end of Bill Clinton’s presidency.”225 In the same timeframe, ironically, non-military imports 
from the US have tripled.226 While the KSA remains dependent on the importation of skilled and 
unskilled labor, industrial technologies, food, and more, less and less of these non-military items 
are channeled through direct government-to-government contracts. In this way, the visible 
decrease in the US governments’ stake in the KSA has allowed for a rebirth of conventional 
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transnational penetration. Today, nearly 300 joint US-Saudi firms operate in the KSA without 
the supervision of any Joint US-Saudi Commission.227 
The apparent inconsistency between the US government’s enlarged role in selling arms 
and reduced role in economic development can ultimately be explained by the US’ overall 
independence from Saudi petrodollars. While the KSA has invested increasingly in the US 
Treasury, raising its reserve holdings from about $10 billion in the 70s to over $100 billion in the 
last decade, a recent outbreak of hostilities demonstrated their contemporary power imbalances 
[table 3].228 Although the Saudi Foreign Minister now denies the charge, after Senators Schumer 
and Cornyn introduced the “Justice Against Sponsors of Terror Bill” in the fall of 2015, Adel Al-
Jubier threatened to withdraw $750 billion in treasury securities and other assets from the US.229 
Though the Saudis were initially provoked by the proposal to remove sovereign immunities for 
anyone proven to have helped facilitate 9/11, once the bill became law, Al-Jubier explained, “We 
don’t use monetary policy and we don’t use energy policy and we don’t use economic policy for 
political purposes. When we invest, we invest as investors. When we sell oil, we sell oil as 
traders.”230 Thus, what looked like a chance for petrodollars and politics to mix, ended as a 
hollow threat. 
Perhaps more striking than the Saudi Foreign Minister’s about-face was the near 
unanimous disregard for these threats in Congress. If “US hegemony is [still] strongly 
underpinned by petrodollar recycling,” as William Engdahl has claimed, then is it certainly 
curious why Congress would pass the 9/11 Commission and endanger US access to Saudi 
petrodollars?231 Distinct from the negligence underpinning the US’ dismissal of Saudi political 
demands in the lead up to the 1973 embargo, today’s Congressional opposition is likely rooted in 
a reality of independence. Indeed, the KSA is now only the 11th largest holder of US securities, 
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behind Japan and China who each hold at least ten times as much. 232 While Saudi holdings 
represent less than 2 percent of outstanding US bonds, they represent 20 percent of the KSA’s 
foreign reserves. 233 Thus, while a withdrawal of funds would certainly have a noticeable impact 
on the stability of the dollar, it would likely cause greater turmoil in the KSA, which has 
experienced increasing deficits over the past three years.234 Indeed, the fracking boom has not 
only led to more oil independence on the part of the US, but less financial independence on the 
part of the KSA. In the end, just as the embargo produced ruptures and continuities in the US-
Saudi relationship, changes in the contemporary oil market and political landscape of the Middle 
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